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In the wake of the Lopez,1 Morrison,2
and SWANCC3 decisions, certain applica-
tions of Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act (Endangered Species Act)
may be vulnerable to Commerce Clause
challenges.  Up until now, the Fifth,
Fourth, and D.C. Circuits (as well as a few
lower federal district courts) have uni-
formly upheld the constitutionality of the
ESA against Commerce Clause chal-
lenges.  These courts have, however,
offered differing arguments of varying per-
suasiveness to harmonize the ESA with
the Supreme Court’s recent Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.4 Analysis of sever-
al major cases addressing the constitu-
tionality of Section 9 as applied to
intrastate endangered species of little
economic value on non-federal land sug-
gests that the regulation of these
extremely local creatures does not fit
neatly into the framework established by
Commerce Clause Challenges
to the Endangered Species Act’s
Regulation of Intrastate Species
on Private Land
By Lilly Santaniello 
 Lilly Santaniello is a 2004 candidate for
Juris Doctorate at U.C. Hastings College of the
Law.  She recieved a Bachelor of Arts from U.C.
Berkeley in 1992 and a Master of Arts from
Columbia University in 1994.  Ms. Santaniello
would like to thank Professor John D. Leshy for his
invaluable help and guidance in writing this paper.
1.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
3.  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United Stated Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001)[hereinfter SWANCC].
4.  Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the
Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 Pace Envtl. L.
Rev. 653, 669 (2002).  Lazarus suggests that the
Supreme Court will not agree to hear the issue of
the constitutionality of the ESA in the absence of
a circuit conflict, which to date does not exist.
the Supreme Court.5 This article exam-
ines the analyses relied on by several
courts and evaluates the extent to which
the courts are faithful to the standards
laid out in Lopez, and more recently,
Morrison.
Several sources of analytical difficul-
ty have emerged for lower courts attempt-
ing to resolve the relationship between
Section 9 of the ESA and the Supreme
Court’s newly limited vision of the
Commerce Clause.  One issue is the iden-
tification of the activity being regulated
for purposes of Commerce Clause analy-
sis.  For example, when construction of a
hospital threatens to take an endangered
fly through habitat modification, is the
activity being regulated the actual take of
the fly or the activity of constructing the
hospital?   Courts have also offered varied
solutions to the issue of what precisely
constitutes an economic activity.
Specifically, when someone kills an
endangered wolf in order to protect his
livestock, is the economic motivation
enough to render the activity economic in
nature?  A third question is, when may the
“aggregation principle” be applied to non-
economic, intrastate activity without
abrogating the holdings of Lopez and
Morrison?  Furthermore, how does the
aggregation principle relate to the “larger
regulatory scheme” theory, which permits
regulation of seemingly trivial, non-eco-
nomic activities when this regulation is
necessary to effectuate a larger economic
regulatory scheme?  Finally, what signifi-
cance will the Supreme Court’s recent
insistence upon the distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly
local have on Section 9?
This article explores courts’ answers
to these questions through an analysis of
four major decisions from three United
States Courts of Appeals: National
Association of Home Builders, et al v. Babbitt6 (a
case was decided before Morrison), Gibbs v.
Babbitt,7 GDF Realty Investments, Ltd., v.
Norton,8 and Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton. 9
First, Section 9 of the ESA and the
Supreme Court’s recent Commerce Clause
decisions are described.
A.  Section 9 of the ESA
“Person” is defined to include private
individuals, corporations, and federal and
non-federal officials and entities.10
Section 9 prohibits any “person” from
doing any harm to members of listed
species.11 The definition of harm
includes significant habitat modification
or degradation.12 The question raised by
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5.  In United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475
(9th Cir. 1997), the court upheld the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, as applied to sale and possession of
Bald Eagle parts, under the Article I, Section 8
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Article II treaty-
making power, and the Commerce Clause.
Because the Bald Eagle offers a somewhat differ-
ent case than the wholly intrastate species
addressed in this paper, Bramble will not be dis-
cussed further.
6.  130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
(1998).
7.  214 F. 3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
(2001).
8.  2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 5818 (5th Cir. Mar. 26,
2003).
9.  2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6218 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1,
2003).
10.  THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 104 (Stanford
Environmental Law Society et al. eds., 1st ed.
2001).
11.  Id.
12.  Id. at 106.
to actions by private individuals, on pri-
vate land, involving harm to members of
purely local species of no known econom-
ic value, exceeds the constitutional limits
of the Commerce Clause.  An answer to
that question requires answers to a whole
host of accompanying questions:  What
are traditional state powers?  Is regulation
of endangered species a traditional
sphere of state action?  Is the question
better formulated in terms of who tradi-
tionally has authority to regulate land?
The environment?  Scarce natural
resources? Wildlife?  How should non-
economic motives for regulation be rec-
onciled with requirements that the regula-
tion have some connection with econom-
ic activity?   The cases below offer some
answers to the above questions.
B.  Notable Supreme Court 
Commerce Clause Decisions
1.  Lopez
In 1995, the Supreme Court held that
Congress had exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause when it
enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990  (GFSZA).13 The GFSZA made it a
federal offense for any “individual know-
ingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone.”14 This
decision marked a shift for the Court from
a long line of cases, beginning in 1937,
that upheld legislation enacted under
authority of the Commerce Clause.15
Perhaps the most extreme application of
the Commerce Clause to wholly intrastate
activity occurred in Wickard v. Filburn.16
The Wickard Court upheld application of
the Agricultural Amendment Act to the
production and consumption of home-
grown wheat.17 The Court held that
although one farmer’s consumption of
homegrown wheat might have a trivial
effect on interstate commerce, the aggre-
gate effects of many farmers growing
wheat for their own consumption, and not
purchasing wheat on the market, would
affect the price of wheat and thus inter-
state commerce.18
The Lopez Court identified three cate-
gories of activity that Congress can regu-
late under its Commerce Clause power:
Congress may regulate the use
of the channels of interstate
commerce.
Congress may regulate and pro-
tect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate com-
merce, even though the threat
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13.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
14.  Id.
15.  Id. at 554-55 (citing NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See NLRB v.
Jones, 301 U.S. at 37 (upholding the National Labor
Relations Act and abandoning the distinction
between direct and indirect affects on interstate
commerce; intrastate activities that “have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions” are within Congress’s power).
16.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (citing Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942)).
17.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
18.  Id. (citing Wickard at 128-29).
Congress may regulate those
activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce;
i.e., those activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate com-
merce.19
The Lopez Court then elucidated four
reasons for finding that the GFSZA did not
fit within the third category. (All parties
agreed that the first two categories were
inapplicable to these facts.)  
The Lopez Court held first that the
GFSZA is a criminal statute that “by its
terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’
or any sort of economic enterprise, how-
ever broadly one might define those
terms.”20 Chief Justice Rehnquist con-
trasted the GFSZA with Wickard, as the
exemplar of the Commerce Clause’s fur-
thermost reach, and found that the pos-
session of a gun in a school zone, unlike
the growing of wheat for home-consump-
tion, was not an economic activity.21 The
Lopez court distinguished the two cases:
the statute at issue in Wickard was
designed to increase the price of wheat,
whereas the GFSZA was not part of a larg-
er regulation of economic activity.22
Second, the Lopez Court held that the
GFSZA contained “no jurisdictional ele-
ment which would ensure, through case-
by-case inquiry, that the firearm posses-
sion in question affects interstate com-
merce.”23 Third, the Court pointed to the
lack of legislative findings regarding the
effects on interstate commerce of gun
possession near schools.24
Congressional findings are not a neces-
sary element of a valid exercise of
Commerce Clause power but they are
helpful.25 Fourth, the Court held that if
the attenuated link between gun posses-
sion near schools and economic costs to
the nation through poorer education and
higher insurance rates is enough to sus-
tain a Commerce Clause challenge, then
federal power is limitless insofar as it
would be difficult to imagine an activity
that Congress could not regulate under
this standard.26
Harkening back the words of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v Maryland,
the Lopez Court argued that the federal
government is one of enumerated pow-
ers.27 Furthermore, Rehnquist recalled
the principle that “enumeration presup-
poses something not enumerated.”28
These two ideas led the Court to conclude
that a vision of the Commerce Clause that
allows Congress to regulate any activity is
necessarily flawed.  Additionally, the Lopez
Court concluded, such a vision blurs the
important distinction between “what is
truly national and what is truly local.  This
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19.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
20.  Id. at 561.
21.  Id. at 560.
22.  Id. at 561.
23.  Id.
24.  Id. at 562.
25.  Id. at 562-63.
26.  Id. at 564.
27.  Id. at 566 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 405 (1819)).
28.  Id. at 566 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
1, 9 (1824)).
29.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-69.
2.  Morrison
When it decided U.S. v Morrison in
2000, the Court reaffirmed the new direc-
tion it had taken five years earlier in
Lopez.30 Morrison clarified that Lopez signi-
fied a new approach to Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, not merely an anomaly.31
In Morrison, the Court struck down the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)32,
because it exceeded Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority.33 The Court
held that, under Lopez, the conclusion was
clear:  “Gender-motivated crimes of vio-
lence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity.  While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregat-
ing the effects of any non-economic activ-
ity in order to decide these cases, thus far
. . . our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in
nature.”34 Furthermore, like the GFSZA,
the VAWA lacked a jurisdictional element
ensuring that the federal cause of action
applied only to cases related to interstate
commerce.35
However, the VAWA was significantly
different from the GFSZA in one respect:
the VAWA was preceded by voluminous
congressional findings detailing the cost
of violence against women.36 The Morrison
Court held that these findings were unper-
suasive because they relied on the same
flawed reasoning that the Court rejected
in Lopez: attenuated but-for causation
from the initial act to the most distant
economic effects.37 The real problem for
the Court with the attenuated-effects
argument was that this logic would permit
Congress to regulate any crime shown to
have an eventual economic impact and
would ultimately allow Congress to use
the Commerce Clause to “completely
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction
between national and local authority.”38
The Morrison Court exhibited a strong con-
cern for maintaining certain clearly-
defined spheres of “traditional state regu-
lation,” such as marriage, family law, and
crime. 39 The Chief Justice cited Justice
Thomas’s concurrence in Lopez: “ We always
have rejected readings of the Commerce
Clause and the scope of federal power
that would permit Congress to exercise a
police power.”40
After Lopez and Morrison, two aspects
of the decisions stand out: the insistence
that the scope of the Commerce Clause
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30.  529 U.S. 598 (2000).
31.  Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce
Clause by Another Name: The Impact of U.S. v. Lopez
and U.S. v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 615
(2001).  The authors point out differing conclu-
sions regarding Lopez’s reach among commenta-
tors.  Dral and Phillips also point out that in U.S.
v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995), decided one
week after Lopez, the Court upheld a conviction
under RICO because the defendant imported peo-
ple and goods into his state of residence from
other states in order to conduct illegal business.
Dral and Phillips argue generally that Morrison and
Lopez offer unworkable and inconsistent standards
regarding the Commerce Clause. 
32.  42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2004).
33.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
34.  Id. at 613.
35.  Id.
36.  Id. at 614.
37.  Id. at 615.
38.  Id.
39.  Id. at 615, 617.
40.  Id. at 617-18.
the equally strong insistence that tradi-
tional federal-local distinctions be main-
tained—with the addition that one tradi-
tional and important distinction is the
reservation of a general police power to
the states.  In fact, it seems as if the eco-
nomic/non-economic distinction is a tool
for maintaining the local-federal distinc-
tion.41 The Morrison Court asserted that
“we reject the argument that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent crimi-
nal conduct based solely on that con-
duct’s aggregate effect on interstate com-
merce.  The Constitution requires a dis-
tinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local.”42 As the juxta-
position of these two sentences without
any accompanying transitional phrase
demonstrates, the Court does not fully
explain why the need to maintain a dis-
tinction between what is state and what is
federal requires a distinction between
economic and noneconomic activity.  This
gap in the majority’s reasoning is
addressed very ably by the dissenters.
Justice Souter began by pointing out
that the Court’s previous cases stand for
the proposition that Congress can “legis-
late with regard to activity [not economic
activity] that, in the aggregate, has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.”43
Justice Souter then went on to ask why the
majority chooses to revive the formalist
economic/noneconomic distinction, and
he found that the answer was “that in the
minds of the majority there is a new ani-
mating theory that makes categorical for-
malism seem useful again . . . [it] is useful
in serving a concept of federalism.”44 The
majority’s twin motives are perhaps what
makes application of Lopez and Morrison so
difficult for lower courts.  
Justice Breyer had illuminating com-
ments in his dissent as well.  Justice
Breyer asserted that the
economic/noneconomic distinction is not
easy to work with:  For example, does the
streetcorner mugger engage in economic
or noneconomic activity when he steals
for money?45 Breyer argued that in cer-
tain circumstances, the Court has upheld
the regulation of noneconomic activity
(racial discrimination) at economic estab-
lishments (motels, restaurants).46
Furthermore, in an example especially rel-
evant to the ESA, Breyer asked why we
should focus exclusively upon the nature
of the cause—after all, if chemical emana-
tions through indirect environmental
change cause identical, severe commer-
cial harm outside a State, why should it
matter whether local factories or home
fireplaces release them?47 These points
make the difficulties with the majority’s
reasoning dramatically clear; the focus
until Lopez was on the interstate commer-
cial nature of the effects, not the commer-
cial nature of the cause.48 One commen-
tator has argued that the Court’s new
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41.  Id. at 617.
42.  Id. at 617-18.
43.  Id. at 628.
44.  Id. at 644.
45.  Id. at 656.
46.  Id. (citing generally, Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
47.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 658.
48.  Id.
actually produce the opposite effect from
what the Court intended; this will occur
when Congress ensures the constitution-
ality of its actions by deliberately broad-
ening the scope of regulation in order to
gather trivial, intrastate activities into the
net of national regulation.49
3.  SWANCC
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided
another case, Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, et al (SWANCC), that hinted at
possible negative implications for the
Endangered Species Act.50 Two questions
were raised in SWANCC.  Did the Corps
exceed its statutory authority when it
interpreted the Clean Water Act to cover
non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters
based on the presence of migratory birds?
Alternatively, did Congress lack the power
under the Commerce Clause to grant fed-
eral regulatory jurisdiction over such
waters?51 The Court decided the case
upon statutory grounds, thus avoiding the
constitutional question.52 However, the
Court did express doubt regarding the
authority of Congress under the
Commerce Clause to confer federal juris-
diction over such waters.53 Regarding the
constitutional challenge, Chief Justice
Rehnquist returned to the question
debated in Lopez and Morrison: What is “the
precise object or activity that, in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce”?54 The SWANCC Court went
on to suggest that allowing the Corps to
claim “federal jurisdiction over ponds and
mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird
Rule would significantly impinge upon the
State’s traditional and primary power over
land and water use.”55
The precise impact of SWANCC on
the ESA and for environmental regulation
in general is difficult to determine.56
However, the decision at the very least
hints at some skepticism in the Court
regarding Congress’s ability to regulate
intrastate environmental activities.  As
one commentator, Charles Tiefer, has said
of the relevant portion of the decision:
The passage . . . preserves the
uncertainty left by Morrison and
Lopez about just how far a major-
ity of the Court will go in reject-
ing—or accepting—regulation
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49.  Adrian Vermuele, Does Commerce Clause
Review Have Perverse Effects? 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325,
1332-33 (2001).  Professor Vermuele argues that if
the goal of the new Commerce Clause review is
decentralization by shifting authority to the states,
it may fail to achieve its purpose.  Because
Congress can regulate invalid provisions as part of
a larger “regulatory program,” there is an incentive
for Congress to create even more nation-wide pro-
grams then it had done before Lopez. Thus, the
result is increased, rather than decreased, central-
ization. See 1325, 1333.
50.  SWANCC, at 531 U.S. 159.
51.  Id. at 165-66.
52.  Id. at 173.
53.  Id.
54.  Id.
55.  Id. at 174.
56.  Michael J. Gerhardt writes that Morrison
and SWANCC “seem to suggest that what matters
for the purposes of aggregation in Commerce
Clause cases is whether the basic purpose of the
law is economic, not whether some economic
activity is the means to achieve a non-economic
goal.” The Curious Flight of the Migratory Bird Rule, 31
ELR 11079 (2001).
ally, it falls between the least
commercial nature of the
s c h o o l - a n d - w o m e n - s a f e t y
issues of those two cases, and
the most commercial nature of
regulation that focuses solely on
commercial activities for com-
mercial goals.”57
In another recent article, Bradford
Mank suggested that Morrison and
SWANCC raise serious questions as to
Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate
species with little current economic value.
Mank adds that the regulation of such
species may also intrude on traditional
state control over land use.58
In his dissent, Justice Stevens
responded to the majority’s Commerce
Clause remarks by pointing out that,
unlike the activities at issue in Lopez and
Morrison, discharging fill material into “the
Nation’s waters is almost always under-
taken for economic reasons.”59
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued,
migratory birds are the basis of a host of
commercial activities engaged in by mil-
lions of people.60 Next, Stevens
explained that the Migratory Bird Rule
does not blur the distinction between
what is local and what is national because
“the protection of migratory birds is a
textbook example of a national prob-
lem.”61 Migratory birds typify many envi-
ronmental problems in that the benefits
are local while the costs are dispersed
beyond state limits.62 Stevens concluded
by arguing that because the Commerce
Clause gives Congress the power to regu-
late environmentally hazardous activities
that may have effects in more than one
state, the Commerce Clause must give
Congress the power to regulate individual
actions that, in the aggregate, would have
the same effect.63
II.  Application of Lopez and Morrison to
the ESA
A.  National Association of 
Homebuilders v. Babbit
In 1996, by a two-to-one vote, the
D.C. Court of Appeals upheld a Commerce
Clause challenge to the ESA.64 The three
separate opinions written in this case
exemplify the difficulty of resolving Lopez
(NAHB was decided before Morrison) with
certain applications of the ESA. The case
arose from a discovery that the proposed
site for a new hospital in San Bernardino
County was one of the last remaining
habitats for the an endangered Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly (the Delhi Fly),
listed by the U.S. Fish Wildlife Service
(FWS) the day before construction was to
begin.65 The Delhi Fly’s remaining habi-
tat, located exclusively in a small area of
southern California, was no more than
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57. Charles Tiefer, SWANCC: Constitutional Swan
Song for Environmental Laws or No More than a Swipe at
Their Sweep?, 31 ELR 11493 (2001).
58.  Bradford C. Mank,  Protecting Intrastate
Endangered Species: Does the ESA Encroach on Traditional
State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the
Commerce Clause? 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 754 (2002).
59.  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 193.
60.  Id. at 194.
61.  Id. at 196. (citing Justice Holmes in
Missouri v Holland,  252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920)).
62.  Id.
63.  Id.
64.  NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041.
65.  Id. at 1043-44.
lar population directly threatened by the
hospital’s construction numbered no
more than six to eight individual flies in
all.66 In the past, the DelhiFly was wide-
spread, but as of 1993, only 2 percent to 3
percent of its original habitat remained
undeveloped.67 The NAHB court address-
ed the following question: Can the federal
government regulate the use of nonfeder-
al lands to protect the Delhi Fly, even
though it is found only within one state?68
While the question was answered in the
affirmative, the two affirming judges and
the dissent came up with very different
analyses of the Commerce Clause’s rela-
tionship to this provision of the ESA.
Professor Nagle explains the crucial
distinctions in the three judges’
approaches very clearly in his article, The
Commerce Clause Meets the Dehli Sands Flower-
Loving Fly.69 Nagle points out that the
three judges come up with different argu-
ments because each of them asks a differ-
ent question.70 Judge Wald asks whether
there is a substantial relationship
between endangered species in general
and interstate commerce.  Judge
Henderson asks whether there is a rela-
tionship between the hospital and inter-
state commerce.  The dissenter, Judge
Sentelle, asks whether there is a relation-
ship between the Delhi Fly and interstate
commerce.71
1.  Judge Wald’s Majority Opinion
Judge Wald argued that under the
analysis laid out by the Supreme Court,
the regulation of the taking of endangered
species is within Congress’s Commerce
clause power under categories one and
three of the Lopez test: regulation of the
use of channels of interstate commerce
and regulation of activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.72 Wald
argued that the first category applied for
two reasons.  One, the government must
prohibit takings of endangered species in
order to prevent the transport of the
species in interstate commerce.  Second,
the government has authority under the
Commerce Clause, per Heart of Atlanta
Motel, to keep the channels of interstate
commerce free from immoral and injuri-
ous uses.”73
Regarding the first Lopez category,
Wald compared NAHB to a case where the
Ninth Circuit upheld a Commerce Clause
challenge to purely intrastate possession
of machine guns, because regulation of
intrastate possession of machine guns is
necessary to control interstate traffic in
machine guns.74 Wald also analogized
between Heart of Atlanta and NAHB.  In
Heart of Atlanta, Congress used its
Commerce Clause power to prohibit racial
discrimination by a hotel serving inter-
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66.  Id. at 1044.
67.  http://shanana.berkeley.edu/essig/endins/
raphiomi.htm (last visited April 15, 2004).
68.  NAHB 130 F.3d 1045.
69.  John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Dehli Sands Flower-Loving Fly,  97 MICH. L.
REV. 174 (1998).
70.  Id. at 178.
71.  Id.
72.  NAHB, 130 F. 3d at 1046 (citing Heart of
Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
256 (1964)).
73.  Id.
74.  Id. at 1047 (citing United States v. Rambo,
74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996)).
used its Commerce Clause power to pre-
vent the destruction of a species by the
construction of a hospital.  The construc-
tion will use materials and construction
workers from outside the state, and the
hospital will employ and serve people
from outside the state.75 According to
Wald, Heart of Atlanta stands for the propo-
sition that “access to the channels of
interstate commerce may be regulated in
order to prevent injurious local practices
that in turn have a substantial harmful
effect on interstate commerce either by
discouraging such commerce or by incit-
ing a race to the bottom.”76
Respecting the third Lopez category,
Wald argued that Congress has the power
to regulate any activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce, whether or
not the activity is commercial or non-
commercial.77 She proceeded to argue
that the protection of endangered species
substantially affects interstate commerce
for two reasons.  One, protecting the
species protects biodiversity, which is
valuable because we do not know which
species may offer future medical cures
that will be of great commercial value.78
Second, the regulation of endangered
species prevents a destructive race to the
bottom.79 Wald argued that several
Supreme Court cases offer support for the
proposition that wholly intrastate, non-
commercial activities may be regulated in
order to prevent a race to the bottom.80
Specifically, she cited Hodel and Darby.
Hodel required miners to restore land to its
prior condition after mining was complet-
ed.  The Court held that regulation of sur-
face coal mining was necessary to prevent
adverse effects on interstate commerce,
and that the Commerce Clause permits
regulation of activities causing environ-
mental hazards that may affect more than
one state.81 In Darby, the Court upheld
wage regulations, aimed at preventing
destructive interstate competition, for
intrastate employees producing lumber
for interstate commerce.82
2.  Judge Henderson’s Concurrence
Judge Henderson argued that the first
Lopez category, regulation of the channels
of interstate commerce, did not apply to
NAHB.83 She read the decisions Wald
relied on as limited to cases where “the
object of regulation [is] necessarily con-
nected to movement of persons or things
interstate and could therefore be charac-
terized as regulation of the channels of
commerce.”84 The Delhi Fly, however,
does not move interstate, on its own or
through human intervention.  Therefore,
the first category does not apply.85 While
Judge Henderson agreed that the third
Lopez category did apply, she offered her
own argument as to why.  She refuted
Wald’s argument by pointing out that
uncertain future medical and economic
value is too hypothetical a possibility to













75.  Id. at 1048.
76.  Id. at 1049.
77.  Id.
78.  Id. at 1054-55.
79.  Id. at 1056.
80.  Id. at 1057 (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314, 324 (1981); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941)).
81.  Id. at 1055.
82.  Id. at 1056.
83.  Id. at 1058.
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
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commerce.86 Henderson did, however,
uphold application of the ESA to the
Delhi Fly because loss of biodiversity has
a substantial effect on our ecosystem and
thus on interstate commerce.87
According to this rationale, the loss of one
species (the Delhi Fly) will affect other
lands and objects in interstate commerce,
due to the interconnectedness of species
and ecosystems.88 Henderson found that
the Commerce Clause reached the activity
at hand—construction of the hospital—
which had a clear connection with inter-
state commerce.89 Henderson thus justi-
fied allowing the Commerce Clause to
reach the Delhi Fly from two different
directions: One, the loss of species can
adversely affect ecosystems and thus
affect things clearly involved in interstate
commerce.   Second, the ESA can be
viewed as a regulation of land use and
development.  If this premise is accepted,
the regulation of the construction of the
hospital has a clear connection to inter-
state commerce.90
3.  Judge Sentelle’s Dissent
Judge Sentelle’s position on the
application of the ESA to intrastate
species is simply that killing flies in
southern California is not commerce and
it is not interstate.91 Quoting Judge
Kozinski’s description of the Commerce
Clause as the “hey-you-can-do-whatever-
you-feel-like clause,” Sentelle asserted
that Lopez has put an end to unchallenged
use of the Commerce Clause.92 First,
Sentelle dismissed Judge Wald’s admit-
tedly weak argument that the first Lopez
category—regulation of the channels of
commerce—applied to the Delhi Fly.
Sentelle pointed out in response to
Wald’s first argument that preventing
habitat destruction does nothing to elim-
inate the Delhi Fly from the channels of
interstate commerce.93 Sentelle argued
that the third Lopez category did not apply
to this case either, because the regulation
does not control a commercial activity or
an activity necessary to the regulation of
some commercial activity.94
4.  Analysis of NAHB
One weakness with NAHB as a prece-
dent for upholding application of Section
9 against future Commerce Clause chal-
lenges is the majority’s argument that the
combined extinction of all endangered
species substantially affects interstate
commerce.95 This argument seems to
conflict with Morrison, which rejects the
aggregation of noneconomic activities in
order to achieve the requisite substantial
affect on interstate commerce.96 Another
issue NAHB leaves somewhat unresolved
is the identity of the activity being regu-
lated—the taking of the fly, the construc-
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all endangered species?  The answer to
this question seems even more important
after Morrison and SWANCC.
B.  Gibbs v. Babbit
In 2000, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the ESA against a
Commerce Clause challenge.97 The par-
ticular endangered species at issue, the
red wolf perhaps posed a better test case
for upholding the statute than did the
seemingly insignificant Dehli Sands
Flower-Loving Fly.  Chief Judge Wilkinson,
besides having more to work with,
advanced a very coherent analysis of the
issues.  Wilkinson opened his opinion
with the following words:  “In this case we
ask whether the national government can
act to conserve scarce natural resources of
value to our entire country.”98 This for-
mulation of the question makes the
answer clear—yes, the federal govern-
ment must have the authority to protect
natural resources valuable to us all.  
The particular facts of the case were
this: the red wolf was once abundant in
the southeastern region of the United
States.99 The wolf’s primary habitat was
river bottomlands, where its principal
prey, swamp and marsh rabbits, are
found.100 However, due mainly to human
activities such as the drainage of lands for
farming, building of dams, and hunting,
the wolf was near extinction.  In 1967 it
was listed as an endangered species.101
FWS captured the remaining species and
placed them in captive breeding programs
with the intention of reintroducing them
back into the wild.102 Forty-two wolves
were later reintroduced into national
wildlife refuges, and some of the wolves
moved from the refuges onto private
land.103 Federal regulations allow a red
wolf to be taken on private land if the tak-
ing is in defense of human life or if it is
done by landowners when the wolves are
in the act of killing livestock or pets.”104
In 1990, the plaintiff, Richard Mann, shot
and killed a red wolf he thought was
threatening his cattle.105 Mr. Mann filed
an action challenging the federal govern-
ment’s authority to protect the wolves on
private land, specifically alleging that the
regulation exceeds Congress’ s power
under the Commerce Clause.106
1.  An Economic Activity 
Substantially Affecting Interstate
Commerce.
Judge Wilkinson began by asserting
that according to Morrison, intrastate activ-
ities may be subject to federal regulation
if the activity in question is some type of
economic endeavor and the activity has a
substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.107 Therefore, the court must
determine whether the taking of wolves
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phrase, economic activity.”108 The court
held that the taking of wolves is econom-
ic activity because the protection of com-
mercial and economic assets is a primary
reason for taking red wolves.109
Next, the court explored the relation-
ship between the wolf and interstate com-
merce.  The Gibbs court found that the red
wolf is commercial in four major aspects:
tourism, scientific research, potential
trade in pelts, and agriculture.
Furthermore, the Gibbs court asserted that
because the taking of wolves is an eco-
nomic activity, under the aggregation
principle, individual takings may be exam-
ined together; that is, while taking one red
wolf may not substantially impact inter-
state commerce, the correct question is
whether the taking of red wolves in the
aggregate has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce.111 The Gibbs court
further explained that each type of com-
mercial effect—tourism, research, and
trade—can be added together to deter-
mine whether the result is sufficiently
substantial for Commerce Clause purpos-
es.112
The Gibbs court stated that wildlife-
related recreation in this country is an
industry worth twenty-nine billion dollars
a year and that red wolves can be expect-
ed to attract tourists to North Carolina
through “howling events” and various
educational programs.113
Scientific research is another area
where the Gibbs court argued that red
wolves play a significant role.  The Gibbs
court cited several studies on red wolves
to support its contention that such
research generates jobs as well as knowl-
edge.114 Additionally, scientific research
has potential future value in terms of
unknown medical uses for animals, as
well as knowledge leading to commercial
development of the red wolf.115
The Gibbs court found another some-
what surprising potential value in the red
wolf—a renewed trade in its pelt.116 In
support of this theory of economic value,
Wilkinson cited a Senate Report regarding
the ESA, which argued that the protection
of endangered species might eventually
allow controlled exploitation of species,
thereby producing profit and trade other-
wise unavailable due to extinction.117
The Gibbs court proffered the American
alligator as an instance where this process
was successful.  In 1975, the alligator was
nearing extinction and became a listed
species.  Now there is a “vigorous trade” in
its hide.118
Lastly, the Gibbs court asserted that
the taking of the wolves relates to inter-
state agriculture.119 Landowners take
wolves because they threaten livestock.
Thus, while the regulation prohibiting
such takes is an impediment to commer-
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nonetheless legitimizes the regulation.120
The Gibbs court stated that it is “well-set-
tled under Commerce Clause cases that a
regulation can involve the promotion or
the restriction of commercial enterprises
and development.”121 Citing United States
v. Darby, the court explained that “the
motive and purpose of a regulation of
interstate commerce are matters for the
legislative judgment.”122 The court found
that “it is not beyond the power of
Congress to conclude that a healthy envi-
ronment actually boosts industry by
allowing commercial development of our
national resources.”123
2.  An Essential Part of a Larger 
Regulation of Economic Activity
In a very strong argument, Wilkinson
analogized between the situation of the
Red Wolf and the situation in Hodel v.
Indiana, where the Supreme Court held, in
connection with surface mining, that a
“complex regulatory program . . . can sur-
vive a Commerce Clause challenge with-
out a showing that every single facet of
the program is independently and directly
related to a valid congressional goal.”124
The Gibbs court goes on to explain that the
regulation at issue here is part of the ESA,
which Congress enacted in order to con-
serve the nation’s environmental health.
As the Gibbs court pointed out, listed
species are necessarily limited in number;
the effects of taking these species should
not be looked at individually, but rather
seen as part of a process of complete
extinction of the species.125 The goal of
Congress in enacting the ESA was to halt
the extinction of endangered species.
Therefore, the taking of individual red
wolves should be seen as part of an over-
all plan to reverse the extinction of the red
wolf and endangered species generally.126
The Gibbs court held that it would be
extremely odd to argue that Congress has
the power to regulate abundant species
that have measurable impacts on com-
merce while those nearing extinction are
outside of its reach.127 The acceptance of
such an argument would significantly, if
not completely, impair the efficacy of the
ESA; endangered species are by definition
few in number.
One major advantage of Wilkinson’s
argument that the specific provision is
part of larger regulatory scheme is that it
can apply to animals even less economi-
cally valuable than the red wolf.  Going
back to the Delhi Fly—Judge Wald was
forced to assert, in her opinion, that it
“was not beyond the realm of possibility”
that the fly might have some commercial
value in pollinating farms.128 Clearly,
such attenuated and hypothetical eco-
nomic benefits are a very frail foundation
for supporting Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority.  However, even the fly
would be covered by the “larger regulato-
ry scheme” theory as a necessary element
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3.  Federalism Issues
In response to Lopez and Morrison’s
insistence upon the separation between
the federal government and areas of tradi-
tional state sovereignty, Wilkinson argued
that state regulation of wildlife is “circum-
scribed by federal regulatory power.”129
The Gibbs court cited several cases in sup-
port of this assertion.  In Hughes v.
Oklahoma, the Court held that states do
not own the wildlife on their land, and
that state laws regulating wildlife are lim-
ited by Congress’s ability to regulate pur-
suant to its Commerce Clause power.130
Furthermore, Wilkinson rejected the argu-
ment that the regulation of the taking of
red wolves on private land intrudes on the
“state’s traditional police power to regu-
late local land use.”131 The Gibbs court
asserted that while states do retain signif-
icant control over local land use, it is clear
that the federal government has authority
to regulate private activities in order to
protect the environment and wildlife.132
The Gibbs court distinguished the ESA’s
regulation of wildlife from the purpose of
the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison,
where the regulation of possession of a
firearm and of violence against women
impinged on criminal laws—traditional
state concerns.133
Furthermore, Wilkinson argued that
the necessity for federal regulation in this
area is made more apparent by the need
to prevent the destructive “race to the bot-
tom” created by interstate competition, as
explained by the Supreme Court in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass’n.134 This motive was shared by the
enactors of the ESA; the House avowed
that protection of endangered species
could not be handled without “coherent
national and international policies.”135
Additionally, unlike the VAWA or
GFSZA, where federal law coexisted with
state law, in the case of the red wolf, the
federal government is solely responsible
for the species.  As the court explains, §
17.84(c) does not replace or supplement
any existing law regarding the wolf.136
Finally, the ESA does not offer the
danger the Supreme Court perceived in
the VAWA and GFSZA, which was that the
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point—no limit to federal police
power.137 This anxiety is misplaced with
regard to the ESA, the Gibbs court argued,
insofar as federal power is already limited
to the conservation of only those species
that are endangered or threatened.  Thus
the ESA stops short of conferring a broad
police power upon Congress.138
4.  Luttig’s Dissent
Judge Luttig responded to
Wilkinson’s majority opinion with a strong
dissent.  Luttig was the author of Brzonkala
v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, the case over-
turning the VAWA, which the Supreme
Court upheld in the renamed U.S. v.
Morrison.139 Luttig began his counter-
argument by asserting that the question
before the court is not “whether the gov-
ernment can act to conserve scarce natu-
ral resources” but whether “this one par-
ticular Fish and Wildlife regulation
exceeds Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause.”140 Luttig found the
evidence Wilkinson proffered in support
of his argument that the red wolves have
economic value through tourism, science,
possible pelt trade, and agriculture inade-
quate and unconvincing.141 Because he
rejected the evidence of the wolves’ eco-
nomic value, Luttig then asserted that the
regulation does not touch economic activ-
ity as required by Lopez and Morrison and
therefore is an invalid exercise of
Commerce Clause authority. 142 He sup-
ported this contention by stating that the
“killing of even all 41 of the estimated red
wolves that live on private property in
North Carolina would not constitute an
economic activity” for Commerce Clause
purposes.143 Luttig asserted that killing
red wolves was not an economic activity.
Consequently, he argued against the
Wickard aggregation principle because the
Morrison Court held that “[w]hile we need
not adopt a categorical rule against aggre-
gating the effects of any noneconomic
activity in order to decide these cases,
thus far in our Nation’s history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation
of intrastate activity only where that activ-
ity is economic in nature.”144
Luttig then proceeded to say that
even if one did accept the takings of
wolves as an economic activity, the regu-
lation would still fail a Commerce Clause
challenge because the activity is not one
that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.145 In response to Wilkinson’s
suggestion that the regulations should be
viewed as part a larger regulatory scheme,
Luttig said only that the activity in ques-
tion does not have an “obvious economic
character and impact, such as is typically
the case with non-wildlife natural
resources, and even with other wildlife
resources.”146 Luttig neither elaborated
further on this assertion nor illuminated it
with specific examples or citations.  He
concluded with these words: “The affirma-
tive reach and the negative limits of the
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depending upon the subject matter of the
particular legislation under challenge.”147
5.  Analysis of Gibbs
Overall, the Gibbs decision is a strong
one.  The arguments that Wilkinson
offered regarding, tourism, a larger regula-
tory scheme, and federal involvement
with wildlife/resource protection are per-
suasive.  The tourism argument, however
convincing it is in this instance in demon-
strating a “substantial” affect on interstate
commerce, is unlikely to succeed with
such species as the Dehli Sands Flower
Loving Fly or the “subterranean, eyeless
Tooth Cave Spider” or the “Kretchmarr
Cave Mold Beetle,” species with very little
current tourism value or potential.148
One of the weaker aspects of the Gibbs
decision is the assertion that because reg-
ulating the taking of red wolves will have a
negative impact on commercial activities
such as ranching and farming, the regula-
tion is thus a valid exercise of Commerce
Clause power.149 This analysis seems
contradictory to Morrison and Lopez;
Congress cannot justify its regulation of
an activity under the Commerce Clause by
arguing that once it is regulated, it will
effect commerce.  The activity must have
some demonstrable link to commerce—
some economic quality—before the regu-
lation is in place in order for the regula-
tion of that activity to withstand a
Commerce Clause challenge.150
Otherwise, the Commerce Clause would
be without limitation; any activity can be
regulated in such a way so as to affect
commerce.  This is the result Morrison and
Lopez rejected.
C.  GDF Realty v. Norton
The 5th Circuit offered an analysis of
the ESA’s constitutionality that borrowed
from and improved upon the analysis of
the 4th Circuit in Gibbs.  Because the 5th
circuit was faced with a more difficult
challenge in terms of justifying the indi-
vidual value of the endangered species
itself—the spider versus the Red Wolf—
the GDF court was forced to rely more
heavily upon the larger regulatory scheme
theory.151 Factually, the situation in GDF
closely resembles the situation in NAHB.
The FWS listed 6 subterranean inverte-
brate species as endangered in 1988 and
1993.152 These species were found on the
property of the plaintiffs, who wished to
develop their land for commercial and
residential purposes.153 The Cave
Species are wholly intrastate, being found
only in Texas.154 The lower district court
granted summary judgment to the FWS,
holding the take provision to be constitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause
because it directly regulated plaintiffs’
proposed property development.155 The
lower court pointed out that there could
hardly be a more direct and substantial
link to interstate commerce than a Wal-
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ment.156 The GDF court did not agree
with the lower court’s analysis, although
in the end, it did uphold the take provi-
sion.157
1.  The Aggregation Principle
The GDF court found that there are
two ways in which wholly intrastate activ-
ity may be found to substantially affect
interstate commerce.158 First, the activity
itself may have a substantial affect on
interstate commerce.  Second, in some
cases, the activity’s effects “may be aggre-
gated with those of other similar activi-
ties, the sum of which may be substantial
in relation to interstate commerce.”159
The GDF court then explained that it is
difficult to determine when Congress may
lawfully apply the aggregation principle
because any “imaginable activity of
mankind can affect the alertness, energy,
and mood of human beings, which in turn
can affect their productivity in the work-
place, which when aggregated together
could reduce national economic produc-
tivity.”160 The GDF court argued that this
was an unacceptable result because it
would destroy any judicially enforceable
limit on Congress’ authority under the
Commerce Clause, “thereby turning that
clause into what it most certainly is not, a
general police power.”161 The GDF court
explained that, as the Supreme Court has
made clear in Lopez and Morrison, the
aggregation principle is limited.162
According to the GDF court, Lopez and
Morrison seem to require that when the
aggregation principle is applied to wholly
intrastate activities, those activities must
be economic in nature.163 However, the
GDF court also pointed out the Lopez hold-
ing that “[w]here a general regulatory
scheme bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence.”164
Additionally, Lopez held that the de min-
imis instance “must be an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activities
were regulated.”165 The GDF court then
analyzed the application of the above
Supreme Court holdings to the specific
circumstances of the Cave Species.
The GDF court asserted that under
Morrison, the regulated activity must be
economic.  However, first the court must
determine what exactly constitutes the
regulated activity: the developers argued
that for the purpose of evaluating sub-
stantial effect, the court should look sole-
ly at the taking of the Cave Species, while
the FWS, on the other hand, proposed
that the planned commercial develop-
ment along with its effects on interstate
commerce is the regulated activity.166
While the lower court agreed with the ana-
lytical model propounded the FWS, the
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scope of the inquiry is “primarily whether
the expressly regulated activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce, i.e.,
whether takes, be they of the Cave Species
or of all endangered species in the aggre-
gate, have the substantial effect.”167 The
GDF court held that nothing in the
Commerce Clause or in the Supreme
Court’s decisions interpreting the clause
implies that activity may be regulated
only because non-regulated conduct by
the actor engaged in the regulated activi-
ty has some connection to interstate com-
merce.168 While the effect of the ESA reg-
ulation may sometimes be to prohibit
development, Congress is not directly reg-
ulating commercial development through
the ESA.169 The GDF court pointed out
that the reasoning accepted by the lower
courts would lead to inconsistent results;
it “would allow application of otherwise
unconstitutional statutes to commercial
actors, but not to non-commercial
actors.”170 Furthermore, the GDF court
argued that expanding the definition of
the regulated activity would result in vir-
tually unlimited regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause, a conse-
quence forbidden by the Supreme
Court.171 The GDF court disagreed with
Judge Henderson’s concurrence in NAHB,
which held that because the ESA regula-
tion prohibiting takes affects the hospital
and highway, which in turn have a connec-
tion to interstate commerce, the regula-
tion is a valid exercise of Congress’
power.172
FWS argued that Cave Species takes
alone have a direct relationship to and
substantial affect on interstate commerce
through the scientific interest surround-
ing the species and the species’ possible
future commercial value.173 The GDF
court found that the fact that some scien-
tists have traveled to Texas to study the
Cave Species and that articles have been
written about them is insufficient to
establish a substantial effect on com-
merce; it is an effect, but not a substantial
one.174 The GDF court distinguished the
Cave Species from the Red Wolf in Gibbs,
which clearly did have an impact on inter-
state tourism.175 Additionally, the GDF
court rejected FWS’s claim that the possi-
ble future commercial benefits of the Cave
Species will substantially affect interstate
commerce.176 The GDF court found that
the purely speculative, unknown future
medicinal value of the Cave Species is far
too “hypothetical and attenuated from the
regulation in question to pass constitu-
tional muster.”177
FWS offered an alternative argument
for the conclusion that takes of the Cave
Species will have substantial affects on
interstate commerce.  FWS asserted that
the takes of Cave Species may be aggre-
gated with the takes of all other endan-
gered species, which would certainly
achieve a substantial affect on interstate
commerce.178 The GDF court rejected the
assertion that takes of all endangered
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pose, because the Supreme Court
requires that intrastate activity must be in
some sense economic before it can be
aggregated.179 FWS argued that all
endangered species are aggregated; thus,
“Cave Species takes will have a substan-
tial affect on interstate commerce [and]
these takes can be classified as commer-
cial.”180 The GDF court replied that this
argument made no sense in that it would
“render meaningless any ‘economic
nature’ prerequisite to aggregation.”181
Clearly, the GDF court is correct with
regard to the holdings of Lopez and
Morrison. The Lopez Court did not neces-
sarily reject the possibility that posses-
sion of guns near schools could have a
substantial affect on interstate commerce,
but rather the idea that the regulation of
such non-economic activity traditionally
handled by State governments could be
justified under Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority.
The GDF court upheld the ESA’s take
provision on the theory that the “ESA is
an economic regulatory scheme; the regu-
lation of intrastate takes of the Cave
Species is an essential part of it.
Therefore, Cave Species takes may be
aggregated with all other ESA takes.182
The GDF court held that in order to invoke
the “larger regulatory scheme” principle,
that larger regulation must be economic
in nature.183 Looking to the legislative
history of the ESA, the court found that
the statute’s protection of endangered
species was primarily economic.184
According the House Reports, Congress
was concerned about the unknown role
different species play in the ecosystem
and thus the effect their extinction could
have upon humans and other non-endan-
gered species.185 Furthermore, the GDF
court held that, although the ESA has no
express jurisdictional element as Lopez
suggested, it is limited in its application
to instances connected to interstate com-
merce in that the direct link between
endangered species, biodiversity, and the
national economy is, according to the
court, clearly established.186 Finally, the
GDF court argued that the link is not so
attenuated as to make regulation of all
general land use or wildlife preservation
possible; it is limited to species loss,
which in turn is linked to substantial com-
mercial effects.187
D.  Rancho Viejo v. Norton
The DC Circuit again upheld a
Commerce Clause challenge to Section 9
of the ESA, as applied to a wholly
intrastate endangered species—the
Arroyo Toad (Toad).188 The Rancho Viejo
court analyzed the regulation of the Toad
first under Lopez and NAHB.  Second, it
examined the developers’ arguments that
the analysis in NAHB was called into
question by Morrison and SWANCC.189 As
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opers acknowledged, the facts of Rancho
are virtually indistinguishable from
NAHB.190 Both cases deal with large
commercial developments located exclu-
sively in California and threatening the
habitats of wholly intrastate endangered
species.  The developers in Rancho are less
sympathetic than the county hospital-
builders in NAHB; the hospital builders
made many concessions on behalf of the
Delhi Fly.  Conversely, the developers in
Rancho refused to move a fence that sepa-
rated the Toads from a nearby creek and
refused to substitute fill gathered off-site
for fill taken from the Toad’s habitat.
These two accommodations would have
been sufficient to allow the project to go
forward, if the developers had agreed to
them.191
The Rancho court first analyzed the
facts in light of its own application of Lopez
in NAHB.192 Because the facts in NAHB
and Rancho were so similar, the conclusion
that the housing construction would
result in a take of the Toad was inevitable
once the NAHB analysis was adopted.193
The Rancho court next addressed the
developers’ contention that SWANCC and
Morrison undermine the analysis and hold-
ing of NAHB.194 The developers contend-
ed that under Morrison, the economic or
noneconomic nature of the regulated
activity is outcome determinative.195 In
response, the Rancho court argued that
according to Morrison, the question is
whether the challenge is to a “regulation
of activity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce.”196 Furthermore, the
Rancho court stated that what SWANCC
requires is a determination of “the precise
object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate com-
merce.”197 The Rancho court held that that
neither Morrison nor SWANCC altered the
analysis conducted in NAHB.198
Furthermore, the Rancho court held that
the developers’ argument that the Morrison
court “came pretty close” to adopting a
categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of noneconomic activity was irrele-
vant to the case, because the regulated
activity in Rancho was economic.199
The Rancho court identified the tak-
ings, not the Toads themselves, as the rel-
evant regulated activity.  Consequently,
the court reasoned, the activity at hand—
commercial development—was clearly
economic.200 The Rancho court explained
its rationale in the following way: “[t]he
ESA does not purport to tell toads what
they may or may not do.  Rather, section 9
limits the taking of listed species, and its
prohibitions and corresponding penalties
apply to the persons who do the taking,
not to the species that are taken.”201
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195.  Id. at *26.
196.  Id. (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (2000))
197.  Id. at *27 (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173
(2001)). 
198.  Id. at *41-42.
199.  Id. at *26-27.  The Rancho court does not
address the distinction between interstate and
intrastate noneconomic activity in its analysis of
the impact of Morrison on NAHB’s precedential
value.
200.  Id.
201.  Id.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), (a)(1)(B)).
described the VAWA and the GFSZA as
involving situations where “neither the
actors nor their conduct had a commercial
character, and neither the purposes nor
the design of the statute had an evident
commercial nexus.”202 The Rancho court
found that the Toad facts were distin-
guishable from the VAWA and GFSZA
facts: the actor was a real estate develop-
er and the conduct the construction of a
housing project.203 Additionally, the
Rancho court argued that the ESA has mul-
tiple purposes, at least one of which is
preservation of the commercial value of
species diversity.204
Next, the Rancho court addressed the
argument that because the ESA bans
other takings that are, unlike the housing
project, clearly noncommercial, such as a
hiker walking through the woods and
harming a Toad, the regulation is uncon-
stitutional as applied to the Toad.205 The
Rancho court offered two responses to this
argument.  One, the court referred to the
“larger comprehensive regulatory scheme”
theory used by several of the courts
addressing Commerce Clause challenges
to Section 9 of the ESA.206 However, the
court’s use of Hodel v. Indiana was new:
because “much activity regulated by the
ESA does bear a substantial relation to
commerce, it may well be that the hiker
hypothetical proffered by the plaintiff is of
no consequence to the statute’s constitu-
tionality.”207 In a footnote, the Rancho
court supplied an alternative basis for
upholding the constitutionality of the
ESA: the substantial effect the loss of bio-
diversity would have on interstate com-
merce.208 However, the court held that a
determination regarding the applicability
of the ESA to hikers was irrelevant
because the developers had argued that
Section 9 was unconstitutional as
applied.209
Lastly, the Rancho court rejected the
developers’ argument that under Morrison,
the ESA is an “an unlawful assertion of
congressional power over local land use
decisions,” because local land use is an
area of traditional state concern.210
Citing extensively from Gibbs, the Rancho
court held that the ESA is a response to a
specific problem of national concern and
does not infringe upon state power.211
The Rancho court did not, however, borrow
from Gibbs the argument that this particu-
lar application of Section 9 could be
upheld as part of a “larger regulatory pro-
gram.”  
1.  Ginsburg’s Concurring Opinion
Chief Judge Ginsburg filed a concur-
ring opinion in which he agreed with the
majority opinion in full, but added one
further point.  Ginsburg averted to the
Supreme Court’s requirement that there
must be a “logical stopping point” to the
rationale offered for upholding the appli-
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329 (1981)).
207.  Id. at *42-43.
208.  Id. at *44 n.20.
209.  Id. at *43-44.
210.  Id. at *48.
211.  Id. at *49-51.
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Ginsburg argued that the logical stopping
point of the Rancho court’s rationale with
respect “to a species that is not an article
in commerce and does not affect inter-
state commerce, [is that] a take can be
regulated if—but only if—the take itself
substantially affects interstate com-
merce.”213 Thus, according to Ginsburg, a
person hiking in the woods or a home-
owner who moves dirt to landscape his
property is outside the reach of Section 9,
even if he takes a Toad, because the activ-
ity that accomplished the take is not one
that substantially affects interstate com-
merce.214 Ginsburg pointed out that
without this limitation, the government
could regulate any activity that resulted in
a take, no matter how unconnected to
interstate commerce.215
2.  Analysis of Rancho Viejo
In Rancho Viejo, the court evaded the
entire aggregation principle quandary by
holding that the regulated activity was the
housing development, not the taking of
Toads.  The decision that the commercial
development constituted the relevant reg-
ulated activity is more problematic, in
light of Morrison and SWANCC, then the
Rancho court acknowledged.  First, even
within the D.C. Circuit in NAHB, only the
concurring judge, Judge Henderson, held
that the “regulated activity” was the con-
struction of the hospital.216 On the other
hand, Judge Wald, writing for the majority,
cited numerous cases in order to demon-
strate that an activity need not be com-
mercial in character in order to withstand
a Commerce Clause challenge.217
However, the application of Section 9 to a
take caused by a commercial develop-
ment clearly does fall within the outer
limits exemplified by Lopez and Morrison;
both of those cases involved individual,
noncommercial actors with no evident
connection to interstate commerce.  In
other words, application of Section 9 to
intrastate endangered species is, at the
very least, a less extreme regulation of
noneconomic, traditionally state-man-
aged activity than the GFSZA or the VAWA.
As Judge Ginsburg pointed out in his con-
currence, the rationale offered by the
Rancho court explicitly excludes from its
reach individual, noncommercial actors
with no evident connection to interstate
commerce (the lone hiker.)218
Judge Ginsburg’s concurrence sug-
gests that, under the rationale offered by
Rancho, the Gibbs decision might have
come out differently.  The Gibbs court
argued that because ranchers’ shot wolves
to protect their property, the taking was an
“economic activity.”219 But under the
Rancho rationale, shooting wolves resem-
bles the lone hiker in the woods or the
homeowner shifting dirt to landscape his
property more than it resembles substan-
tial commercial development.   However,
this does not mean that the Rancho court
left the wolves wholly unprotected.  The
court did not explicitly reject the “larger
regulatory scheme” theory put forth in
Gibbs and GDF.  In addition, the Rancho
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219.  Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
biodiversity itself has substantial enough
an effect to warrant regulation under the
Commerce Clause.220
IV.  Conclusion
Thus far, the majority of circuit judges
seem strongly inclined to uphold the ESA.
While Judge Luttig, writing the dissent for
Gibbs, and Judge Sentelle, writing the dis-
sent for NAHB, offered vehement argu-
ments against allowing Section 9 of the
ESA to be upheld under the Commerce
Clause, the trend is clearly in favor of
interpreting Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC
to allow regulation of noncommercial,
intrastate endangered species.
However, will the Supreme Court
agree with the appellate courts?  GDF
Realty and Rancho offer an interesting con-
trast—the two cases were decided with a
week of each other, but used sharply
divergent rationales for upholding Section
9 under the Commerce Clause.   The GDF
court’s logic has the advantage of justify-
ing the entire ESA in a single argument:
the ESA is national regulatory program
motivated at least in significant part by
concern over the economic loss of endan-
gered species, and thus even trivial
intrastate takes may be included within its
scope.221 Additionally, the GDF court
offered supplementary rhetoric in support
of withholding a general police power
from the federal government, which
matches well with the concerns of the
Court in Morrison, Lopez, and SWANCC.222
The GDF rationale has the additional
advantage of allowing the regulation of
takes by private actors—unlike the ration-
ale relied upon by the Rancho court, the
GDF court’s larger, regulatory scheme the-
ory would certainly include within its
scope even the lone hiker in the woods
stepping on an intrastate endangered
species.  The GDF court located the eco-
nomic factor required by Morrison squarely
in the over-all regulatory scheme, and
therefore circumvented the need to iden-
tify the economic character of any individ-
ual take.223 Furthermore, the GDF court
created at least the appearance of accom-
modating the holdings of Morrison and
Lopez by stressing two requirements: that
the larger regulatory scheme be economic in
nature and that the intrastate, noncom-
mercial activities included be essential to
the regulation.224
One could argue, however, that the
rationale offered by the GDF court will
have an effect contrary to the current
Court’s expectations.  As discussed in
above, Professor Vermuele has explained
that recent Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, because it allows provisions that
would be invalid when regulated alone to
be included within a larger regulatory pro-
gram that is valid when taken a as a
whole.225 Thus, the GDF rationale could
be problematic in terms of Morrison and
Lopez insofar as it lacks a clear limiting
principle.  
From the perspective of environmen-
talists, the GDF rationale has the virtue of
simplicity.  Under the GDF rationale, all
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and it is not necessary to examine or sup-
port the value of any particular species.
Moreover, there are probably few environ-
mental or natural resource regulations
that cannot be described as economic in
some sense.  In fact, the ESA is most like-
ly one of the least economically justified
environmental regulations, insofar as the
consequences of extensive species loss
are somewhat speculative (as opposed,
for example, to the known consequences
of air pollution.)  Furthermore, the GDF
rationale does not require a separate jus-
tification and analysis for individual, non-
commercial actors, such as the lone hiker.
Similarly, the Rancho rationale has
both advantages and disadvantages.  The
Rancho court solved the relevant activity
problem by identifying the construction
that will effectuate the take as the regulat-
ed activity.226 The question remains,
however, whether takes accomplished by
smaller projects may be validly regulated
under the Commerce Clause.  When
answering whether the regulated activity
“substantially affected” interstate com-
merce, the Rancho court asserted that
“there can be no doubt that such a rela-
tionship exists for costly commercial
developments like Rancho Viejo’s.”227
How costly must the development be to
fit within the Rancho framework?  The
answer to that question is not clear.  Most
takes are caused by commercial develop-
ment, rather than hikers or private indi-
viduals landscaping their property, so this
exception to the reach of Section 9 may be
trivial.  Additionally, the Rancho court left
open the possibility of Section 9 capturing
the lone hiker within its scope through
different arguments, although the court
did not explain how those arguments
would comport with Morrison and Lopez.228
In his concurrence, Chief Judge
Ginsburg argued that the Supreme Court
requires any rationale upholding an exer-
cise of Commerce Clause power to have a
logical stopping point.229 Ginsburg rea-
soned that in order to supply the requisite
stopping point, the Rancho court’s ration-
ale must explicitly exclude the lone hiker
and individual landscaper.230 This “logi-
cal stopping point” does mirror the factors
the Court found important in Lopez and
Morrison.  Like the attacker woman-beater
in Morrison or the gun-holder in Lopez, the
lone hiker is a private individual, motivat-
ed by noneconomic concerns, who is nor-
mally subject only to a local police power
rather than federal regulation.  As
Ginsburg explained, without the above
limitation, no activity by any individual,
would be beyond the power of the federal
government to regulate, no matter how
unconnected with interstate com-
merce.231 However, unlike the “larger, reg-
ulatory scheme” theory supplied by the
GDF court, the economic activity solution
of Rancho could be less successful in envi-
ronmental contexts other than the ESA.
For example, what would happen to
Justice Breyer’s example of the home fire-
places causing environmental dam-
age?232 Would the fireplaces fit within the
framework established by the Rancho
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At this point in time, in the absence
of a circuit split, Section 9 of the ESA
seems as though it can be safely applied
to noncommercial, intrastate endangered
species.  Furthermore, if in the future, the
Court does in the future uphold a
Commerce Clause challenge to Section 9,
environmentalist have two additional
lines of attack: the Treaty Power233 and
the Property Clause.234 But for now, the
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233.  Omar N. White, The ESA’s Precarious Perch:
A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and
the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 225 (2000).  A
discussion of the Treaty Power is outside the
scope of this paper.  However, White argues that,
as established in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), the federal government has the authority
to regulate to protect wildlife under the Treaty
Power.
234.  Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress
“Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal
Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 121-
24 (2001).  Again, a discussion of the Property
Clause is beyond the scope of this paper.  But,
briefly, Professor Appel makes an interesting argu-
ment that in some cases the Property Clause may
offer a better justification for protecting endan-
gered species than the Commerce Clause.  Citing
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426U.S. 529 (1976), he explains
that the Court upheld regulation of wildlife on gov-
ernment property even thought the government
did not assert ownership of the wild horses at
issue.  Therefore, Appel suggests, Congress can
regulate endangered species if those species occa-
sionally occupy federal lands.  In response to
SWANCC, Appel argues that Congress could regu-
late some isolated wetlands by finding that migra-
tory birds are an essential value of public lands,
that they rely on isolated wetlands, and thus that
filling such wetlands would damage the property
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Endangered Species Act Resource Guide
1. Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution - Harmonizing Environmental and
Constitutional Values, 32 Envtl. L. 809 (2002).
Examining the relationship between the Constitution and environmental values in
light of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
2. Maya R. Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers: The Clean Water Act Bypasses a Commerce Clause Challenge, But Can the
Endangered Species Act?, 7 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol'y 191 (2001).
Application of the ESA post Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC.
3. Jeff L. Massey, Swanson Mining Reconsidered: Is Section 7 of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act Constitutional Under the Supreme Court's New Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence?, 8 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol'y 95 (2001).
Describes the effects that Lopez and Morrison have had on application of the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act.
4. National Fish & Wildlife Service: at http://endangered.fws.gov/.  See also the
Species Information section at http://endangered.fws.gov/wildlife.html (information
regarding official listing and status of endangered species.)
Website provides information on endangered species, bulletins, legislation and
what actions citizens can take to influence environmental protection.
6. National Endangered Species Reform Coalition: at http://www.nesarc.org/
Electric, Farming and Building Industry funded website that provides information
about the ESA (Endangered Species Act) ranging from legislation and listed
species to the impact of the ESA.
7. Defenders of Wildlife: at http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/esa/esahow.html.  See
also State Endangered Species Acts at www.defenders.org/pubs/sesa02.html
(Describes the constitutional sources of wildlife protection.)
Website devoted to current environmental problems affecting wildlife, including
the effects of current regulations and proposals on endangered species.
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